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Abstract
A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly
non-causal and/or mathematical, explanations explain in a way that is radically dif-
ferent from the way causal explanation explain. Namely, while causal explanations
explain by providing information about causal dependence, allegedly some abstract
explanations explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from
the microdetails, or causal laws, for example. We oppose this recent trend to regard
abstractions as explanatory in some sui generis way, and argue that a prominent ac-
count of causal explanation can be naturally extended to capture explanations that
radically abstract away from microphysical and causal-nomological details. To this
end, we distinguish dierent senses in which an explanation can be more or less
abstract, and analyse the connection between explanations’ abstractness and their
explanatory power. According to our analysis abstract explanations have much in
common with counterfactual causal explanations.
1 Introduction
There is broad agreement that many explanations derive their explanatory power from
information about dependence. Causal explanations involve causal dependence, and var-
ious kinds of non-causal explanations can arguably be similarly understood in terms of
non-causal dependence of the explanandum on the explanans.1 Indeed, perhaps (al-
most) all explanations involve information about what the explanandum (causally or
non-causally) depends on? This hypothesis, if tenable, could be part of a unified account
of explanations, according to which explanations—causal or otherwise—explain by virtue
of providing information about dependences.
A consideration against this hypothesis comes from explanatory abstractions. Ex-
planations vary in their abstractness: some explanations appeal to relatively abstract
∗We are grateful for the comments, questions, and criticisms from the participants at BSPS15 and
EPSA15. Thank you also to the participants of the Leeds philosophy of science reading group. The sup-
port of MOE Tier 1 grant RG162/14 is gratefully acknowledged.
†This work is the result of an equal collaboration. We list the authors alphabetically.
1See e.g. Woodward [2003], Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b], Ylikoski and Kuorikoski [2010],
Strevens [2008]. Ruben [1990] is an early proponent.
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features of reality, whereas others turn on much less abstract explanans. We value ex-
planatory abstraction, when appropriate: it filters out details that are irrelevant to the
explanation in question. But abstraction does not directly concern what the explanan-
dum depends on. Rather, abstraction is about independence of the explanandum from
the irrelevant details. It is tempting to think, along with various recent authors, that this
information about independence is where the explanatoriness of many abstract explana-
tions lies. This mode of explaining, associated with what is irrelevant to the explanan-
dum, can seem sui generis, dierent in kind from explanations in terms of dependences.
We will argue that explanatory abstractions do not point to a sui generis mode of
explaining. There is no need to revise the idea that explanatory power is a maer of
providing dependence information (and the more the beer); no need to abandon the
hope for a unified account of explanatory power. Here we stand against a clear trend
that urges the opposite: that some abstract explanations do not fit an account of ex-
planatory power that is focused on (non-)causal dependence.2 More specifically, we aim
to undercut prominent arguments supporting the trend we oppose, and to present and
argue for one such unified account, extending the account of causal explanation devel-
oped byWoodward [2003] andWoodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b] to allow it to capture
influential exemplars of abstract explanations behind the anti-unificationist trend.
Before we get to the niy-griy, let us illustrate explanatory abstraction and sketch
some of the key points of the paper. The explanation of why Mother fails to divide her
twenty-three strawberries equally among her three children (without cuing any straw-
berries) turns on the fact that twenty-three is not evenly divisible by three.3 Citing the
causal details or laws involved in Mother’s aempt, or the physical constitution of the
strawberries, do not suice to explain this fact. The explanation is independent of such
details; the explanatory mathematical facts hold irrespective of contingent causal laws
and details. So where does the explanatory power associated with mathematics come
from? Mathematical facts do not seem to capture dependence relations between num-
bers that would be analogous to contingent causal and nomological connections. So per-
haps the explanatory contribution of mathematics here cannot be captured in terms of
dependences? Perhaps mathematics’ explanatory contribution is somehow sui generis,
turning on mathematics’ independence from the details of the physical constitution and
the causal laws? We will be concerned with explicating and rebuing this intuition.
We see lile reason to shi focus from dependence to independence in analysing
abstract mathematical explanations of this kind. One easily overlooks a wealth of de-
pendence information that we take for granted here. The explanation does not just tell
us that Mother must fail as a maer of mathematical necessity. It also tells us what the
failure depends on—the number of strawberries—and how. For example, if Mother had
two fewer strawberries or one strawberry more, then she could have succeeded. This
change relating what-if-things-had-been-dierent information is exactly the kind asso-
ciated with explanatory dependence.4 We will argue that this information is doing all
the explaining, and that this is captured by a natural extension of the ideology of causal
2See e.g Lange [2013], Pincock [2007], Pincock [2015] (when arguing that none of the existing depen-
dence accounts can capture highly abstract explanations), Baerman and Rice [2014].
3Cf. Lange [2013], and Braine [1972].
4Most prominently in Woodward [2003].
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explanation according to which explanations function by providing what-if-things-had-
been-dierent information. It has been broadly thought that this ideology is ill-fiing
for capturing abstract, non-causal and/or mathematical explanations, since the relevant
modal and counterfactual notions only apply to causal connections.5 This, we will ar-
gue, is mistaken. The reasons given for leaving behind the counterfactual dependence
ideology associated with causal explanations in connection with abstract explanations
are faulty. And so are the arguments for sui generis, independence-based accounts of
abstract explanations.
The key to seeing the laer is to recognise, first of all, that practically all explanations
have some degree of abstraction, and provide some dependence information. What we
need is away of gauging the explanatory importance of dependence information, relative
to information about independence. We will argue that the explanatory importance of
dependence information is revealed by varying it while keeping the degree of abstraction
otherwise fixed. In the context of the strawberry case, consider removing the dependence
information altogether, first of all, pretending that we can take away all dependence in-
formation based on background arithmetical knowledge, only retaining the information
about the explanandum’s independence from causal laws and features. If all we know is
that as a maer of mathematical necessity Mother’s aempt with twenty-three straw-
berries must fail, so that we are unable to answer any questions about possible changes
that would render her success possible, then it is not clear that we have any explanation
of Mother’s failure.
Consider, now, adding a lile bit of information about dependence, pretending that
we only get to know that Mother could have succeeded with twenty-four strawberries.
Assume that is all the information we have, on top of knowing that twenty-three is not
divisible by three. Here we may have an explanation, but it looks like a very thin one.
Yet, in terms of independence from particular causal laws, processes, and microphysi-
cal conditions, it is on a par with the general explanation that appeals to background
arithmetical knowledge. If the original explanatory information explains by virtue of
showing the explanandum to be independent from physical details and laws, then we
would expect the modified explanation to explain to a commensurate degree. Yet, we do
not see this. When we vary the amount of information about dependence, we also seem
to vary the degree of explanatoriness, in a way that suggests that it has lile to do with
independence information.
To develop the line of thought sketched above we need to lay some conceptual
groundwork. To this end we distinguish three dierent dimensions of abstraction (§2).
Then we show how these distinctions apply to prominent recent conceptions of explana-
tory abstractions (§3). Our key claim is that not all ‘dimensions’ of abstraction are re-
sponsible for explanatoriness, even if good explanations are typically abstract along sev-
eral dimensions. Against the backdrop of these conceptual distinctions we will then
present an alternative counterfactual account of the explanatoriness of abstract expla-
nations in the spirit (but not the leer) of the dependency oriented account developed
5There are exceptions to this. For example, Bokulich [2008a,b, 2012], Rice [2015], and Reutlinger [forth-
coming]. We take ourselves to be in the same tradition as these accounts. However, we will dier from
these accounts in our argument that we need to specify more precisely the kind of what-if-things-had-
been-dierent information that counts as explanatory (which we do in §4).
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by Woodward [2003] and Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b]. In particular, we focus
on how to select the right what-if-things-had-been-dierent counterfactuals (§4). The
virtues of this unified account are illustrated by revisiting a graph-theoretic explanation
of Königsberg’s bridges (§5) and further underlined in relation to other challenges faced
by less unified views of explanation (§6).
2 Three dimensions of abstraction
As said, we will challenge the idea that explanatoriness turns on independence of the ex-
planation from the particular physical laws, processes, or concrete physical structures.
Yet, we think that abstract explanations typically do exhibit this kind of independence.
The task of this section is to distinguish three conceptually dierent ways in which ex-
planations can be abstract. They will all involve independence in one sense or another.
However, we will later argue that only one kind of independence carries information
about explanatory dependence, and, as a consequence, contributes to explanatory power.
Let us recall some simple examples of abstract, plausibly non-causal, mathemati-
cal explanations (what we call ‘abstract explanations’) in order to bring out intuitions
about dierent senses of explanatory abstraction. The following examples have featured
prominently in recent philosophical analyses: (1) Economical bees build hexagonal hon-
eycombs because this is the most resource-eicient way to divide a Euclidean plane into
regions of equal area with least total perimeter [Lyon and Colyvan, 2008]. (2) Plateau’s
laws hold for soap film geometry, because this geometry minimizes the system’s energy
by minimizing the surface area [Lyon, 2012, Pincock, 2015]. (3) Königsberg cannot be
toured by crossing each and every bridge exactly once because of the bridges’ relational
configuration [Pincock, 2007]. (4) The strawberry case discussed above is another exam-
ple.
We will focus on (3) and (4). Abstract explanations hinge on (relatively) abstract fea-
tures of reality that are non-causal (or perhaps causal in a very broad sense of ’causal’).6
This abstractness is obviously partly a maer of relative independence of the explanans
from the actual physical structure of the entities involved: strawberries, bridges, soap
films, honeycombs, etc. This is the first intuitive aspect of explanatory abstraction that
we wish to highlight. There is nothing special about the physical nature of strawber-
ries, for example, that makes them indivisible in this way. The very same explanation
essentially explains why twenty-three marbles (say) cannot be thus evenly divided. The
strawberry explanation abstracts away from whatever concrete features need to be in
place in order for there to be a set of twenty-three individuals that can be divided into
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive subsets.
A second, more radical aspect of abstraction pertains to the fact that the explana-
tions above are independent from the actual laws of nature that underlie the physical
processes presupposed by the why-question: the processes of group division, bridge
crossing, or comb building, for example. There is nothing special, as far as these ex-
planations are concerned, about the actual physics that underlies the solidity of honey-
6The issue of exactly what kinds of dependences count causal is convoluted and largely orthogonal to
our interests in this paper. What we want to understand here is how various abstract explanations explain.
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comb walls, strawberries, or bridges. The same explanations would work just the same
in more exotic, counter-legal possible worlds where the underlying physical laws are
rather dierent (assuming the relevant why-questions still make sense). The explanation
of Plateau’s laws, for example, transcends the nomologically possible causes or grounds
of the area-minimizing action of soap bubbles. This explanation is modally robust with
respect to variation in the underlying physical laws, as long as the laws still give rise to
area-minimizing action for some surfaces. To this extent the explanation abstracts away
from the actual nomological facts pertaining to the systems in question.
So far we have identified a conceptual distinction between two senses of abstrac-
tion. There is also a third aspect of abstraction in the above explanations; one that is
more easily missed. This has to do with the explanatory regularities involved, and the
degree to which an explanatory generalisation is independent from the actual value of
an explanans variable. For example, the fact that twenty-three is not evenly divisible
by three is but an instance of the more general fact that no integer apart from whole
multiples of three is evenly divisible by three. In as far as we judge that the explanatory
work is really done by this more general arithmetical background knowledge, we can say
that essentially the same explanation would answer the question of why Mother would
have failed had she had twenty-two strawberries (or why she could have succeeded had
she had twenty-one). The explanation turns on a regularity that is robust by virtue of
allowing the same explanation to be given for a wide range of changes to the numbers
of strawberries. The wider this range is, the more abstract the explanation, in this third
sense of abstraction.
The above three intuitive aspects of explanatory abstraction all clearly have some-
thing in common. Namely, each involves a way in which an explanation can eectively
be independent from some feature of the system in question. This independence is nat-
urally thought of as follows. An explanation can cover a range of possible systems. Ex-
planatory abstraction is a maer of independence of the explanation from the details
of ‘realization’. In the above cases of abstract explanations the extent of unnecessary
details omied is striking. Consider the Königsberg case, for instance: the explanation is
independent of all the physical and geometrical features of the bridges and the crossing
processes, and of the underlying nomological facts pertaining to the bridges and their
possible crossings, only relying on a very high-level global structural feature associated
with a wide-ranging explanatory regularity. (We will make this more precise later in the
paper.)
The extent of such independence is most striking in the case of abstract explanations,
but more or less any explanation actually exhibits the three dimensions of abstraction
to some degree. Consider the mundane case of gravitational pendulums, for instance.
Why is the period of a given (more or less) ‘ideal’ pendulum 2 seconds? Explaining this
causally, in terms of its length l and gravitational acceleration g, relies on a law-like reg-
ularity that supports the same explanation in a range of possible cases that vary in these
two parameters. (The third dimension of abstraction, above.) Furthermore, the explana-
tion can apply just the same regardless of whether the underlying nomological facts are
rooted in a classical Newtonian world with gravitational force acting at a distance, or
whether the pendulum occupies a general relativistic world with gravity being a mani-
festation of curved spacetime. (The second dimension above.) Finally, the why-question
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presupposes that the pendulum cord is inextensible, but the explanation is independent
from whatever microstructural facts underlie this property. (The first dimension above.)
In light of the fact that more or less all explanations are abstract to some degree along all
three dimensions, it is prima facie surprising that there would be two radically dierent
sources of explanatory power in play: one for the cases that are commonly thought of
as causal and a dierent one for cases of ‘abstract explanation’. We will argue that the
dierence between this mundane causal explanation and ‘abstract explanations’ is one
of degree, not of kind.
The notion of explanatory abstraction as a maer of independence is clearly a modal
notion: it concerns the range of possible systems covered by the explanation. Dierent
aspects of explanatory abstraction have to do with dierent dimensions of modal varia-
tion with respect to these possible systems. We can think of possible systems that vary
from the actual explanandum only in the (nomologically) possible physical structures
of the entities involved; possible systems that vary in the microphysical or dynamical
laws they obey; possible systems that vary from the actual explanandum by varying a
variable that explicitly features in the explanatory regularity employed. Although modal
variation along these dierent dimensions is oen interlinked and metaphysically inter-
twined in complex ways, the dimensions themselves are conceptually independent.7 In
the strawberry case, thinking about the explanatory regularity with respect to a sys-
tem of twenty-three vs. twenty-five strawberries, one need not think about variation in
the physical structures of these entities or the division processes. Similarly, in thinking
about the explanation with respect to systems that vary in the physical structures of the
entities to be divided, one need not think of variation in their number, or of counter-legal
possibilities where the underlying physical laws are dierent. And vice versa.
Oen abstract non-causal and mathematical explanations—like the ones above—
exhibit a striking level of abstraction in each of the three senses. We believe this has
confounded some recent commentators. If one thinks, prima facie, that abstraction in a
particular sense is the source of explanatoriness, it is all too easy to find corroborating
evidence when so many good explanations are highly abstract in that sense. Now that
we have conceptually separated the dierent dimensions of abstraction, however, we
can ask: If explanatory abstraction has something to do with explanatory power (as is
commonly accepted), exactly which dimension(s) of abstraction can contribute to it?
In its full generality, we cannot hope to comprehensively answer this question in
a single paper. There is, however, a narrower question that we can answer. It is com-
monly agreed that explanation (and the associated notion of explanatory power) has
both worldly and pragmatic/communicative aspects. Here, we will largely set aside the
communicative and pragmatic aspects. What is at stake in the debate at hand is whether
abstract explanations require facts tied to independence to function as a source of ex-
planatory power, instead of (or in addition to) facts about dependence. In particular,
are facts related to independence a worldly underpinning of explanatory power for the
paradigmatic cases in the literature (mentioned above)? Our first aim is to undermine
prominent recent arguments that answer ‘yes’ to the last question.
Our second aim is, more positively, to show how these abstract explanations can be
7The dimensions are metaphysically intertwined because, for example, various possible changes in the
physical laws are bound to imply changes in the physical structures.
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accommodated in more unified terms, in the spirit of the counterfactual account de-
veloped by Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b] (the W-H account). According to the
W-H account, explanations provide a particular kind of information about dependence.
This account associates explanatoriness essentially with our third dimension of abstrac-
tion. (Roughly, an explanatory generalisation that has a broader range under which we
can vary the values of the variables provides more explanatory information about the
dependence of the explanandum on these variables than a corresponding explanatory
generalisation with a more restricted range of invariance.) This is in sharp contrast to
recent claims according to which (some) abstract explanations explain either (i) by virtue
of abstracting away from all the concrete physical features of the system in question (our
first dimension above), or (ii) by virtue of abstracting away from the underlying laws of
nature (our second dimension). The W-H account is well liked in connection with vari-
ous causal explanations (even amongst the advocates of alternative analyses of abstract
explanations), but there has been resistance to extending this counterfactual account
to abstract explanations that are (plausibly) non-causal or mathematical. We will argue
that this resistance is entirely unnecessary. Issues concerning explanatory power and
its relation to abstraction are tractable in very natural terms in the spirit of the W-H
account also for abstract explanations, aer the key notions of this account are appro-
priately clarified and refined.
We will next critically review some recent claims regarding explanatory abstraction,
questioning the intuitions that support them. Aer that we will more systematically
discuss the third dimension of abstraction, which has a beer claim to be associated
with the source of explanatory power than either dimension one or two.
3 Explanatory power and independence
Various philosophers have recently argued (in dierent ways) for the disunity of ex-
planatoriness by pointing to the sui generis role of abstraction as a source of explana-
tory power. We will focus on two authors who particularly clearly associate explana-
tory power with either the independence from concrete physical details (dimension one
above), or the independence from the particular laws (dimension two above).
Pincock [2007, 257] brought the Königsberg bridge example into philosophical promi-
nence by identifying it as an ‘abstract explanation’ that ‘appeals primarily to the formal
relational features of a physical system.’ Relational features that are ‘formal’ are clearly
meant to stand apart from causal relations. Furthermore, regarding the explanation of
the impossibility of touring the town by crossing each and every bridge exactly once,
Pincock [2007, 259] accounts:
[A]n explanation for this is that at least one vertex [in the formal graph
structure instantiated by the bridges] has an odd valence. Whenever such
a physical system has at least one bank or island with an odd number of
bridges from it, there will be no path that crosses every bridge exactly once
and that returns to the starting point. If the situation were slightly dierent
[so that] the valence of the vertices were to be all even, then there would be
a path of the desired kind.
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This is all surely correct. The question is how to capture this explanation in philo-
sophical terms. Pincock [2007, 260] intimates that the explanation critically turns on
abstraction:
The abstract explanation seems superior [to a microphysical explanation]
because it gets at the root cause of why walking a certain path is impossible
by focusing on the abstract structure of system. Even if the bridges were
turned into gold, it would still have the structure of the same graph, and so
the same abstract explanation would apply. By abstracting away from the
microphysics, scientists can oen give beer explanations of the features of
physical systems.
The notion of ‘abstracting away from the microphysics’ is naturally construed as being
along the first dimension identified above: a maer of relative independence of the ex-
planans from the physical structure of the entities involved. As Pincock [2011, 213] puts
it: ‘the explanatory power [in this case] is tied to the simple way in which the model
abstracts from the irrelevant details of the target system.’ The intuition is that the ex-
planation comes from stripping away as irrelevant all the physical details pertaining to
the bridges’ make-up, length, location, angles, et cetera, thereby highlighting what is
relevant, namely the formal ‘mathematical structure found in the target system itself’
Pincock [2011, 213].
We can see Pincock’s intuition, but we are unable to see a good reason for viewing
this as a sui generis ‘abstract explanation’. The explanation is undeniably highly abstract
and plausibly non-causal. But the notion that good explanations only provide relevant
information, leaving out unnecessary details, is common ground with dependence ac-
counts of explanation. According to dependence accounts one ought to provide suitable
information about what the explanandum depends on, and one also ought not to claim
(or imply) that the explanation depends on something that it does not. The leaving out
of irrelevant detail is insuicient to motivate the view that ‘abstract explanations’ are
sui generis in the way Pincock regards them.
How about the notion that the explanatorily relevant features of Königsberg are
‘formal-cum-mathematical’? Does this motivate a departure from familiar counterfac-
tual accounts of explanation? We do not think so. We do not regard the explanans formal
or mathematical in any sense that makes the application of counterfactuals diicult. The
explanation involves applied mathematics; it is not an intra-mathematical explanation.
There is a clear sense in which the explanans is just concerned with how many bridges
there are to/from each of the ‘islands’. It is even unclear why the ‘valence’ of an island—
there being an even or odd number of bridges to/from it—is not a high-level physical
feature of it. And similarly for the yet more abstract feature of there being at least one
odd ‘island’ in the whole system of many ‘islands’. Furthermore, there seems to be a
clear and straightforward sense in which the explanandum at stake depends on these,
arguably high-level physical, features: the explanation tells us how the explanandum
would change if there were a dierent number of bridges (as Pincock himself notes; see
the first quote above). Whether this explanatory dependence is causal or not is neither
here nor there for the prospects of sticking to the core idea of the W-H account of ex-
planation: explanatoriness is ultimately a maer of telling us what the explanandum
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depends on.8 When it comes to identifying the worldly source of explanatory power,
we have not yet been given a reason to think that in the Königsberg case explanatori-
ness derives (even partly) from the independence of the explanandum from some worldly
features.
Let us now move on to consider Lange’s [2013] analysis of the explanatory power
of the cited abstract explanations (as ‘distinctly mathematical’).9 Lange [2013, 486–488]
argues that his analysis of these explanations reveals ‘a fundamental dierence’ between
causal explanation and abstract non-causal explanation, and its significance ‘lies in what
it reveals about the kinds of scientific explanations there are’. Abstract explanations,
Lange argues, explain not by supplying information about the world’s network of causal
relations but by ‘showing how the fact to be explained was inevitable to a stronger de-
gree than could result from the causal powers [actually] bestowed by the possession of
various properties.’ This is a nod towards Wesley Salmon’s ‘modal conception’ of scien-
tific explanations, according to which such explanations ‘do their jobs by showing that
what did happen had to happen’ [Salmon, 1985, 293]. As Lange [2013, 505] puts it:
[They explain] not by describing the world’s actual causal structure, but
rather by showing how the explanandum arises from the framework that
any possible causal structuremust inhabit, where the ‘possible’ causal struc-
tures extend well beyond those that are logically consistent with all of the
actual natural laws there happen to be.
According to Lange, abstract explanations may happen to also provide modal infor-
mation that a counterfactual account (in the spirit of W-H account) would count as ex-
planatory. But he explicitly rejects the idea that their explanatoriness in any way derives
from such modal information, relating it instead to information about the independence
of the explanandum from some contingent features of the system in question.10 In con-
trast to Pincock, the critical sense of independence for Lange is in the direction of the
second dimension of abstraction identified above: abstraction away from the actual laws
underlying the features of the system presupposed in the context of the relevant why-
question. In relation to the Königsberg case, for instance, Lange [2013, 505–506] writes:
[The] explanation of the repeated failure to cross the Königsberg bridges
shows that it cannot be done (where this impossibility is stronger than phys-
ical impossibility) [. . . ] The explanans consists not only of various mathe-
matically necessary facts, but also [. . . ] of various contingent facts presup-
posed by the why question that the explanandum answers, such as that the
8Aer heavily emphasising the idiosyncratic features of abstract explanations Pincock [2015] suggests
that it may be possible to provide a unified account in terms of dependence. However, Pincock’s [2015]
notion of dependence is explicitly not in the spirit of the W-H account. We will address Pincock’s [2015]
objection to the W-H account in section §4.
9The term ‘distinctly mathematical’ is a term of art in Lange [2013]. It is aiming to capture many of the
cases that Pincock [2015] would call ‘highly abstract’.
10In relation to the strawberry example Lange argues that the counterfactuals pertaining to the number
of Mother’s strawberries provide causal information, noting e.g. that ‘clearly manipulation of the numbers
of strawberries or children would bring about corresponding changes in the outcome of Mother’s aempt.’
Yet he maintains that ‘this explanation is non-causal because it does not work by describing the outcome’s
causes or, more broadly, the world’s network of causal relations.’ See Lange [2013, 493–496].
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arrangement of bridges and islands is fixed. The distinctively mathematical
explanation shows it to be necessary (in a way that no particular force law
is) that, under these contingent conditions, the bridges are not crossed.
Lange’s account thus emphasizes the way in which the actual physical laws do not
come into play in explanations such as this. Undoubtedly, Lange is right to note that the
sense of abstraction at play goes beyond the first dimension concerning the irrelevance
of nomologically possible physical realizations of the contingent features presupposed
in the context of the why-question. The same explanation would work, in the same way
and to same extent, in a far removed possible world with alien properties and laws—as
long as there is a system with ‘traversible bridges’ for which the why-question makes
sense.
But, having said that, why should we regard this sense of abstraction as a source of
explanatoriness in connection with abstract explanations? The answer to this question
is surprisingly diicult to find in Lange [2013].11 There is lile to directly motivate this,
beyond the commonplace idea that good explanations do not mention irrelevant details,
which in this case include all causal laws. Yet again, the idea that good explanations only
provide relevant information, leaving out unnecessary details, is common ground with
any account according to which we ought to provide information about dependence,
and we ought not to claim (or imply) that the explanandum depends on something that
it does not. Thus, the independence from the actual laws seems insuicient in itself to
motivate the view that abstract ‘mathematical’ explanations are sui generis in the way
Lange regards them.
Both Lange and Pincock are contrasting their views to causal accounts of explana-
tion. It is natural, therefore, to take them to provide a competing account of the worldly
source of explanatory power. So far we have undermined broad motivations for thinking
that abstract explanations require a source of explanatory power that is not centred on
dependence. Our view is that two of the three dimensions of abstraction—even though
undeniably exhibited by abstract explanations—do not actually provide a source of ex-
planatoriness.12 The problem is that these dimensions of abstraction do not provide in-
11Lange’s motivations are best understood in the broader context of his related views on other kinds of
non-causal explanations (e.g. Lange [2015]), and on the modal metaphysics of laws of nature in general
[Lange, 2009]. Like other philosophical views, Lange’s account of abstract explanations can gain indirect
support from being a coherent part of a ‘bigger picture’. Here we do not wish to assess the pros and cons
of this bigger picture; we will focus on Lange’s association of explanatoriness with the second dimension of
abstraction in connection with the paradigmatic examples of abstract explanations.
12This is not to say that they can never be relevant to any aspect of good explanation. To only provide
relevant information is a shared commitment of any account of explanation (cf. Strevens [2008] on causal
explanation). This goes some way towards explaining the intuition that dimension one and two provide a
separate source of explanatory power. For example, if we assume that we have a mistaken belief that the
island taken as a starting point is relevant to explaining the failure to complete a round-tour of Königsberg,
then it is enlightening to find out that the starting island is irrelevant. However, a dependence account
can easily capture this intuition. The failure to complete a round-tour of Königsberg does not depend on
the starting island. A good explanation cannot cite misinformation about the dependences. Note that the
intuition that this kind of information about independence is a source of explanatory power disappears
once we are not focusing on a case of correcting a mistaken belief about dependences. We are not tempted
to regard as explanatory the information that failure to complete the tour is independent of the fact that
the bridges are made of stone and not wood. We never mistakenly believed that the failure to complete the
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formation about explanatory dependence in theW-H sense. We do not, unlike Lange and
Pincock, take it to be the case that explanations that are highly abstract in the first two
dimensions require an account of explanation where the source of explanatory power is
not in the W-H spirit.13 In the rest of the paper we will discuss this specific notion of
explanatory dependence and how it connects to the third dimension of abstraction.
But before we move on, let us address a natural worry. It may seem that dependence
and independence are conceptually so closely connected that we cannot cleanly separate
the two. In particular, any information about independence is also information about
dependence: ‘E is independent fromA’ means that ‘E does not depend onA’, and if we
assume that an explanandumE depends on something, then ‘E is independent fromA’
entails that ‘E depends on something else than A’. It is thus the case, the worry goes,
that information about independence along every dimension of abstraction can provide
information about dependence.
In response, we simply note that it is not true that information about independence
ipso facto provides information about dependence that is explanatory—that is, depen-
dence information in the W-H sense. It is undeniably true that one provides what-if-
things-had-been-dierent information, broadly speaking, by showing that even if the
laws of nature were dierent, Mother could not divide twenty-three strawberries equally
among three children. (What if things had been dierent with respect to laws of nature?
Then Mother would have failed just the same!) But this is not the sort of what-if-things-
had-been-dierent information that counts as explanatory in the counterfactual frame-
work that we favour, according to which only what we call change relating counterfactual
information counts as explanatory.14 To understand Mother’s failure, we need to be able
to say under what conditions Mother could have succeeded. We nowmove on to discuss
this framework.
4 Abstraction in a counterfactual framework
The starting idea of the W-H account is that explanation ‘is a maer of exhibiting sys-
tematic paerns of counterfactual dependence’ (Woodward [2003, 192]). To develop this
into a theory of explanation, we need to say more precisely which paerns of counterfac-
tual dependence maer for explanation. On the W-H account this is done by focusing
on modal information that allows one to answer questions about how the explanandum
would have been dierent under a special type of change in the explanans [Woodward,
2003, 192]. The changes in the explanans that are relevant are those that result from
interventions on the explanans variable(s) (with respect to the explanandum variable).
The notion of intervention is technical; it plays the role of ruling out changes in the
explanans variable that are brought about by (i) changes in the explanandum variable,
and (ii) changes to some other (‘common cause’) variable that changes the explanandum
tour depended on these features.
13As we noted above, Lange [2013, 493–496] explicitly considers and rejects this option. Pincock [2015] is
sympathetic to the general idea of dependence accounts but explicitly rejects W-H dependence as a viable
candidate.
14In the terminology of Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b] an explanatory generalisation must be in-
variant under at least one testing intervention.
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variable independently of the explanans variable.
This approach has a number of aractive features. First, it is natural to take relations
(whether these are nomological, causal, or mathematical) that are explanatory to be ca-
pable of providing some sort of modal information. Second, by requiring more specifi-
cally that themodal information relates to dierent possible states of the explanandum—
how the actual explanandumwould have been dierent had the explanans been dierent—
the account captures the natural idea that explanatory information is information about
worldly dependences. In the W-H account the critical modal notion of dependence gets
cashed out in causal terms through the notion of a (testing) intervention. This allows
one to rule out backtracking counterfactuals—for example, ‘had the period of the pen-
dulum been dierent, then the length of the pendulum would have been dierent’—as
providing the right dependences. The focus on what-if-things-had-been-dierent ques-
tions that concern changes in the target explanandum also provides a clear contrast to
mere subsumption under modal regularities in the spirit of the DN account of expla-
nation. Third, this focus on interventions squares well with much of our experimental
practice. Fourth, the account is, asWoodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b] discuss at length,
very well suited to capture not only what it takes to have an explanation, but also what
makes an explanation beer or worse. Having an explanation is a maer of having the
right information about the dependences, and the more the beer.
The W-H account separates an explanans into two parts: a specification of an invari-
ant explanatory generalisation and a specification of the actual values of the variables
in the explanatory generalisation.15
For a simple illustration, let us look at the explanation of the period of a simple grav-
itational pendulum. Let us assume that we want to explain the fact that the period T
takes the value t1 (our explanandum M ) by using the simple pendulum law. In terms
of the W-H account, we have an explanatory generalisation T ≈ 2pi
√
l
g
. The explanans
consists of this generalisation and in a specification of the actual values of l and g. In or-
der to have an explanation on theW-H account, the simple pendulum law has to (at least
approximately) correctly give the actual value of the period as t1 under an intervention
that fixes the values of l and g to the actual values. Moreover, the simple pendulum law
must capture (in at least one case) how the period would change under at least one (and
ideally more) interventions that change(s) the length or the gravitational acceleration.
It thus captures the dependence of the explanandum on these variables.
Now we are in a position to make the contrast between the dierent dimensions of
abstraction more precise. Let us take the first dimension of abstraction first. In the con-
text of the simple pendulum explanation, we can ask whether the explanandum T = t1
is independent of particular background conditions which are in some sense part of the
system but not represented as variables in the explanatory generalisation T ≈ 2pi
√
l
g
.
We can think of the microphysical features that make the pendulum cord inextensi-
ble, for example, or the mass of the bob, and so on. The degree of independence of the
explanation from such background conditions was the focus of the first dimension of
abstraction. (In contrast to such ‘internal’ background conditions there are other back-
ground conditions that are external to the system and clearly irrelevant, such as, the bob
15See Woodward [2003, 203] for a detailed account.
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being made in Japan, the exchange rate of the US dollar to the Malaysian ringgit, the
colour of the shirt of the person seing the bob in motion, etc.)
In the second dimension of abstraction, we considered the degree of independence of
the explanation from the actual laws of nature. In the context of the pendulum example,
we can ask whether we can vary the actual laws of nature and still expect the simple
pendulum explanation to apply. We can alter many of the laws of, for example, elec-
tromagnetism, without aecting the explanation, provided that those alterations do not
run afoul of the assumptions presupposed in the context of the why-question, for exam-
ple, the cord being nearly inextensible. As mentioned earlier, we can also alter many of
the fundamental aspects of gravitational acceleration, such as whether its nomological
basis is an action at a distance eect or a manifestation of curved space-time.
Finally, in the third dimension of abstraction, we consider the range of conditions di-
rectly relevant to changes in the variables in the explanatory generalisation, T ≈ 2pi
√
l
g
such that the simple pendulum explanation of the period holds. For example, we could
decrease g by, say, moving the pendulum to a higher altitude or to the moon, and we
could change the length of the pendulum, and yet, the explanation of the period would
work in just the same way. On the W-H account, abstractness in this dimension is just
a maer of the invariance of the explanatory generalisation, ‘measured’ by the range of
alternative values of variables l and g for which the generalisation holds and is change
relating.
So far we have simply described theW-H account. Before we can apply these ideas to
the paradigmatic examples of abstract explanations, we need to extend and refine some
of them. In particular, the W-H account was developed as an account of causal expla-
nation, while the abstract explanations we are interested in are plausibly non-causal. As
we move beyond causal explanation, we can no longer appeal to the exact understand-
ing of the relevant class of explanatory counterfactuals that Woodward and Hitchcock
use. They delineate the class of relevant counterfactuals in terms of the causal notion
of intervention: explanatory counterfactuals describe the eect of a testing interven-
tion. These counterfactuals are underwrien by contingent explanatory generalisations,
and the eects of surgical testing interventions are naturally understood as concerning
causal dependences. In the non-causal cases this notion of causal dependence becomes
inapplicable or unnatural, because the notion of causal intervention is inapplicable, or
because the counterfactuals are not underwrien by contingent laws of nature (but,
rather, by logic or mathematics, or metaphysical truths). Is it still possible in these cases
to characterise explanatory dependences in counterfactual terms?
The answer is yes; we have analogous explanatory dependences in the situations
involving Mother’s strawberries, Königsberg’s bridges, etc.16 The challenge is how to
select the right counterfactuals without assuming that causal notions are applicable.
In responding to this challenge we note, first of all, that regardless of whether or not
we can apply the idea of a causal intervention to the explanans variable, we can still
have a good grasp of what it means to change the explanans: e.g. to change the number
16[Woodward, 2003, 221] notes passingly that it seems natural to extend the account to non-causal ex-
planations, but he does not develop it further. For more discussion on how to decouple the counterfactual
aspect and the causal aspect of Woodward’s account, see Saatsi and Pexton [2013], Saatsi [forthcoming],
and Rice [2015].
13
of strawberries, or the bridge configuration in Königsberg. Furthermore, regardless of
whether or not the explanatory generalisation is a contingent law of nature or a stronger
modal truth, we can reason about how the explanandum depends on these changes, and
whether the dependence is non-symmetric in a way that supports explanatory what-if-
things-had-been-dierent reasoning.
For example, in the case of Mother we have a very good grasp of what changing the
explanans variable amounts to. Indeed, changing the number of strawberries seems as
straightforward an intervention as any. We also know how this changes the system’s
divisibility-by-three, and consequently the possibility of Mother’s success or failure. We
thus grasp how Mother’s success or failure explanatorily depends on the number of
strawberries that she has (and the number of children). In order for the dependence
to be regarded as explanatory it needs to be appropriately directed. Intuitively, it is.
As we indicated earlier, the notion of intervention plays the role of blocking changes
to the explanans that go through changes to the explanandum (or through a common
cause variable, etc.). Similarly, changes to the number of strawberries do not seem to go
through changes to the system’s divisibility-by-three, or through changes to Mother’s
success or failure. Aer all, changing the system’s divisibility by three does not mandate
any particular number of strawberries. However, changes to Mother’s success or failure
do seem to go through changes to her number of strawberries (or children).
This intuition can be supported more precisely as follows. On the W-H account a
successful explanation makes use of an explanatory generalisation for two main tasks
(as outlined above). First, to show that seing the value of the explanans variable to its
actual value fixes the value of the explanandum variable to its actual value. Second, to
show that changes to the value of the explanans variable away from its actual value will,
in some cases, change the value of the explanandum variable. Now, consider the intuition
that changes to the system’s divisibility-by-three go through changes in the number of
strawberries, but not vice versa. This is underwrien by the fact the explanatory general-
isation regarding the number of strawberries and their divisibility-by-three supports the
first task above asymmetrically. Fixing the explanans variable to its actual value should
fix the explanandum variable to its actual value, but fixing the system’s (non-)divisibility-
by-three does not fix the number of strawberries to any particular value. In contrast, the
number of strawberries being twenty-three does fix the system’s (non-)divisibility-by-
three. This asymmetry underlies the intuition that changes to the number of strawber-
ries do not go through changes in the system’s divisibility-by-three.17 The asymmetry
does not seem to be a causal maer, however, since the intervention on the number of
strawberries can have an ‘eect’ (e.g. rendering the set divisible-by-three) that is rather
more intimately related to it. To this extent Lange [2013] is absolutely right to stress the
independence of this connection from any causal laws.
Very similar considerations apply to the case of Königsberg’s bridges.18 In this case,
17The explanatory generalisation regarding the number of strawberries and their (non-)divisibility-by-
three supports some counterfactuals running in the opposite direction, of course. For instance, it’s true
that had the system’s (non-)divisibility-by-three been dierent, then the number of strawberries would
have been dierent. So why is this counterfactual not explanatory of the number of strawberries? Answer:
the explanatory generalisation, with the supposed ‘explanans’ variable fixed, does not say what the actual
number of strawberries is.
18The full story here is somewhat more complicated since we are modelling the physical bridge system
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it’s not clear whether the explanans variable—concerning the global configuration of
the whole bridge system—can be changed in a way that necessarily satisfies our intu-
itions about what counts as a causal intervention. But be that as it may, we can surely
have a very good grasp of what it means to change the explanans variable (by strategi-
cally building and destroying bridges so as to achieve a particular overall configuration).
And again, the explanatory generalisation tells us how this changes the bridge system’s
traversability that depends on the configuration being in a certain way. (We will lay this
out in more detail in the next section.) This dependence is again appropriately directed:
while fixing the bridges to be a particular way fixes the (non-)traversability of the bridge
system, the reverse does not hold. We cannot fix the bridges to a particular configuration
merely by ensuring that the bridge system is (say) non-traversable.19
There is more to be said about the nature of explanatory dependence in abstract
explanations, of course. One can wonder about the metaphysics of the dependence re-
lation, for example, as we have not said anything about it. Our hope is that one doesn’t
have to get into metaphysics of dependence in supporting the broader idea of there be-
ing such explanatory dependencies in theworld, transcending those readily incorporated
into the W-H account as it stands. It is enough to show how we can pick out the right
counterfactuals. (This is in tune with Woodward’s own aitude to this issue.)
Or one may wonder what to make of the fact that in the cases at hand the explana-
tory relation does not seem to connect two distinct events; it is not that ‘we change
one thing and another change follows.’20 For instance, the event of destroying some of
Königsberg’s bridges can ipso facto be the event of rendering the bridges Euler-tourable.
In response, we would like point out that it is critical to the W-H account to leave be-
hind the idea that explanatory relations hold between events (or event-types); rather,
explanatory relata are treated as variables. (See e.g. Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,
10-11]) In causal cases this amounts to a notion of explanatory causal relevance between
such variables. Similarly, in the cases at hand it is natural think of explanatory variables
as designating dierent aspects of the system in question. We can make sense of such
variables standing in an explanatory dependence relation, evenwhen changes in the vari-
ables’ values involve one and the same event. (See Saatsi [2016] for related discussion
of explanatory variables in connection with non-causal explanations from ‘geometry of
motion’.)
There is also more to be said about the directionality of explanation. Here we refer
the reader to work done elsewhere, as exemplifying a possible way of developing further
the ideas we have only briefly sketched here.21 But we hope to have said enough to show
and there are considerations of the applicability of the model. The importance of considerations of appli-
cability for directionality of explanation is stressed by Jansson [2015].
19The true counterfactual ‘Had the traversability of the bridge system been dierent, then the system of
bridges would have been dierent’ does not explain the actual bridge configuration for reasons analogous
to those discussed in footnote 17.
20We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this question. (S)he put it in these terms.
21See Jansson [2015] for a suggestion for a nomological dependence account and Jansson [2016] for a
dependence account for metaphysical cases. There is also more to say about how we should understand
optimality explanations, for example, the honeycomb case. We believe that a similar account to the one
that we have given here holds for the honeycomb case too, but this has to be argued for on a case-by-case
basis. The discussion of many of these cases is made more complicated by the existence of closely related
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that the prospects for a more detailed account are no worse—and in our opinion they are
beer—when extending a dependence account in the W-H spirit than when focusing on
independence along the lines of Lange and Pincock.22
Our suggested diagnosis of the original W-H account is that it correctly identifies ex-
planatory counterfactuals as those that are appropriately change relating and directed.
From now on, let us call the explanatory counterfactuals simply change relating counter-
factuals (adapting Woodward’s use of the term) to keep in mind that they are a strict
subset of all counterfactuals and a broader class than interventionist causal counterfac-
tuals. Before we can move on to consider a detailed application of the account, we need
to consider one final aspect of extending the W-H account.
Since the relevant counterfactuals are selected by focusing on changes to some object
or system, the modal information that we are interested in is tied to the system or object
in question. They are what Woodward calls “same object” counterfactuals”:
Suppose that we wish to explain the behavior of some object or system o.
As the standard view is usually understood, it claims that generalizations
of form “All As are Bs” are explanatory of the behavior of o if they support
counterfactuals of the following form: . . . If some object o∗, dierent from o
and that does not possess property A, were to be an A, then it would be a
B.
Call such counterfactuals “other object” counterfactuals: they describe what
the behavior of objects other than o would be under the counterfactual cir-
cumstances in which they are A. By contrast, according to the view I have
been defending, to count as invariant and hence explanatory with respect to
o, a generalizationmust support “same object” counterfactuals that describe
how the very object o would behave under an intervention. [Woodward,
2003, 281]
At first glance this may seem to suggest that all of the explanations that we have in
mind must be about specific, particular systems or objects in order for the distinction—
central to the W-H account—between “same object" (SO) and “other object" (OO) coun-
terfactuals to apply. Pincock [2015] takes this to rule out the application of the W-H
account to abstract explanations, since some highly abstract explanations do not seem
to provide information about any particular object at all (much less information about
changes to any particular object).
In our view, one should not think of the contrast between SO counterfactuals and
OO counterfactuals in the way Pincock does. First, note that even in the case of causal
explanations, most scientific explanations do not have a particular, individual object as
the explanatory target. The explanandum is typically generic (and general even when
couched in language such as ‘the period of a simple pendulum’). The importance of the
causal explanations (as Lange [2013, 500] notes for the honeycomb case).
22In Pincock [2015, 865] the directionality comes from an otherwise unanalysed relation of instantiation,
and in Lange [2013, 508] the directionality comes from an otherwise unanalysed notion of some features
being constitutive of a system. In our view, while these are potential avenues for identifying the source
of non-causal directionality, they are neither more plausible nor beer understood than the alternative
provided by change-relating counterfactuals.
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distinction between SO and OO counterfactuals lies in the fact that it focuses our at-
tention on the right kind of change relating counterfactuals. When we make use of the
simple pendulum law to explain the period of a simple pendulum, the right counterfac-
tuals to have in mind are those that ask how the period of a generic kind of dynamical
system, viz. simple pendulum, is aected by changing, say, its length. Counterfactuals
concerning objects other than simple pendulums do not come into play, even when they
are reasonable and well defined. (It may be true that had a hammer been suspended
around an appropriate pivot with the head down, then we could have used the simple
pendulum law to explain its period, but such OO counterfactuals are not required in
order to explain the period of a simple pendulum.)
Although theW-H account does not apply directly to the case of Königsberg’s bridges,
the central notion of change relating (SO) counterfactuals can be carried over to this case.
This is the work of the next section.
5 Königsberg – Encore!
We will now revisit the Königsberg case to illustrate the above counterfactual account
and its virtues. So far we have mainly criticised Pincock’s and Lange’s motivations for
thinking that there is a sharp distinction between causal explanations and abstract non-
causal explanations, maintaining that one can instead approach both types of explana-
tions in the fundamentally same spirit. We now push for a stronger claim, arguing that
the core claim of the counterfactual account (as we understand it), that explanatoriness
is associated exclusively with the third dimension of abstraction, can be tested against
the alternative viewpoints. This will provide a clear reason to prefer the counterfactual
account.
Let us go back to the 18th c. Königsberg, and ask QK : Why is it impossible to make
a round-tour of Königsberg crossing each of its seven bridges exactly once? An intuitive
explanation-sketch response goes as follows. Clearly each visit of a landmass (‘island’)
requires the use of two bridges: one in, and one out. Else you get stuck. Therefore, in
order for a network of bridges to allow for a round tour—to be ‘tourable’—each island
must have a number of bridges to/from it that is some multiple of two. On the other
hand, if there is one (or more) island(s) with an odd number of bridges to/from it, the
system is not tourable. 18th-century Königsberg had four such troublesome junctions,
rendering a round-tour of Königsberg impossible.
Euler initiated a famed graph-theoretic explanation thatmakes the above sketch pre-
cise. This is standardmaterial in graph-theory textbooks, illustrating the explanatory use
of mathematical notions (such as connected graph, its vertices, and their degrees).23 But
before we get to the graph-theoretic explanation in its full generality, it is worth aempt-
ing to answer QK without graph theory. In the counterfactual framework explanations
must involve an invariant, change-relating generalisation that supports counterfactuals
indicating an explanatory dependence of the explanandum on the explanans. A general-
23It is unsurprising that many authors refer to this explanation as a paradigmatic case of a (distinctly)
mathematical explanation of an empirical fact. In addition to the authors already covered, see e.g. Lyon
[2012].
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isation that thus underwrites an answer toQK could be markedly less abstract and less
general than the graph-theoretic explanation, without thereby being unexplanatory.
As a maer of fact it is easy to find a simple invariant generalisation that furnishes a
non-mathematical answer toQK . Let us focus our aention on the kind of bridge system
that connects exactly four islands, with at most two bridges between any two islands.
Euler’s Königsberg (represented below) is one of these systems.
Figure 1: Königsberg’s bridge system.
There are 395 such bridge systems altogether. We can classify them as follows. Call
a bridge system ‘even’ i each island has an even number of bridges to/from it. In this
particular case, this means that each island must have 2, 4, or 6 bridges to/from it. If a
bridge system is not even, call it ‘odd’. Considering the specific type of bridge system
exhibited by Königsberg, we ask: why is it not tourable? In answering this question
we naturally look for an explanatory generalisation capable of providing suitable modal
information by supporting appropriate, change relating counterfactuals. Focusing our
aention, for now, only on the bridge systems consisting of four connected islands with
at most two bridges between any two islands, a fiing generalisation is not hard to
find: of all these bridge systems, all and only the even ones are tourable.24 This is a
true generalisation about this set of 395 dierent types of bridge systems. It is also a
generalisation that can aord us with a degree of explanatory purchase on QK . That
is, by reference to this generalisation we can begin to answer QK simply by noting that
Königsberg’s bridge system is not tourable, because it is not even; it would be tourable,
if it were odd. Königsberg’s tourability—the feature that is our explanandum—depends
on this high-level physical property of the system.25
More formally, we can define the following binary variables X and Y :
24This fact about these bridge systems can be in principle established by a variety of means, e.g. by at-
tempting to draw every such systemwithout liing your pen, or by playing with a comprehensive collection
of miniature models of such systems. Geing epistemic access, or representing that fact, in principle need
not involve mathematics. (cf. Saatsi [2011])
25Why do we regard this as a (high-level) physical property? Because adding or subtracting a bridge be-
tween any two islands plainly makes for a physical dierence, and we can get from an even configuration to
an odd configuration simply by adding and/or subtracting a suicient number of bridges. Furthermore, if
we are dealing with a finite number of possible bridge systems (as above, focusing on 395 particular config-
urations), we can in principle do without the mathematical concepts of even and odd in delineating the two
kinds of configurations, since the dierence between even and odd is expressible logically without mathe-
matics. So, we see lile reason to regard these as mathematical or purely formal properties of the bridges.
Having said that, we should stress that we are not hereby claiming that the Königsberg explanation is a
causal one, and nothing in our analysis hangs on whether or not the explanation counts as a mathematical
one.
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X = even/odd system
x = 1 : even
x = 0 : odd
Y = (non-)tourable system
x = 1 : tourable
x = 0 : non-tourable
The simple explanatory generalization at stake then states that for bridge systems of
this kind—four islands, maximum of two bridges between any pair—it holds that
X = Y
This equation should be read le to right, as indicating an asymmetric dependence of Y -
variable on theX-variable. The tourability (or otherwise) of a bridge system depends on
it being even (or odd). Being even (or odd) does not depend on tourability; it only depends
on the number of bridges. All in all, the explanation naturally fits the counterfactual
framework presented above (§4).
The explanatory generalisation, while narrow, is explanatory nevertheless, even if
minimally so. Undoubtedly, the explanation provided immediately raises further ques-
tions. Why exactly is this generalisation true, for example? What if we start adding or
subtracting ‘islands’? What if we relax the restriction that there are at most two bridges
between any pair of islands? These are obvious further questions, and this clearly ren-
ders the explanation shallow and somewhat contrived, especially in comparison to a
full-blown graph-theoretic account. But none of this diminishes the philosophical sig-
nificance of this explanation. For however minimal and shallow the toy explanation is,
we deem it to have some explanatory power nevertheless, and we maintain that this is
due to the explanation providing modal information of the right sort.26
The shallow explanation above clearly has a degree of abstractness along the three
dimensions introduced in §2. Indeed, the explanation is highly abstract with respect
to the dierent specific material realizations of the bridges (the first dimension), and
also with respect to the underlying laws of physics (the second dimension). As a maer
of fact, the explanation is as abstract along these dimensions as the full-blown graph-
theoretic explanation! Yet the explanation is shallow. This clearly speaks against the
idea that the (minimal) explanatoriness in question springs from abstraction along these
lines, as Pincock and Lange would have it.
26Is minimal explanation of this sort ever completely satisfactory? That depends on the context of the
why-question. Imagine Königsberg without Euler—or any other mathematician for that maer. The King
of Königsberg, annoyed by his failure to do a round-tour of the city, wishes to understand the situation.
“This city must be made thus tourable, at whatever cost!”, he commands, puing his best people to work.
“Well, actually, the less it costs the beer—and we certainly cannot aord more than two bridges between
any two islands!” The King’s minions get to work, and painstakingly demonstrate, by non-mathematical
means, that for any financially feasible set-up of bridges it holds that it is tourable if and only if it is even.
Equipped with this knowledge, they can explain the situation to the King: “What ever you do with the
bridges, make sure the whole system is even, and you will be able to tour it, since tourability depends on
this feature alone (at least for the kinds of bridge systems we can aord).”
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With regard to the third dimension of abstractness, the explanatory generalisation
does allow us to answer some change relating what-if-things-had-been-dierent ques-
tions. We have counterfactual information of the right, SO, kind. We can answer coun-
terfactual questions about how the tourability of a generic kind of structural system, viz.
bridge system, is changed by changes to the oddness or evenness of the system (at least
as long as we stay within the constraints of four connected islands and a maximum of
two bridges between any two islands). This is what makes it explanatory, even if shal-
lowly so. Yet, its degree of abstractness along this dimension is very limited. Although
the explanatory generalisation never delivers thewrong answer, the generalisation is sim-
ply silent on what happens in cases of more than four islands or more than two bridges
between some islands. Thus, the explanation using the generalisation breaks down in
these cases. 27
In order to understand precisely how the shallow explanation compares in its ab-
stractness to the deeper graph-theoretic explanation, we need to pay aention to the
fact that the variableX concerns a determinable property of the system: it being even or
odd. This determinable property is determined by the bridges’ configuration. There are
various ways for a bridge system to be even. One way is for each island to have (say) 4
bridges to/from it. This is still a determinable property of the system, determined by a
specific way of having 4 bridges to/from each island. (Cf. Figure 2)
Figure 2: Two determinate 4-4-4-4 configurations.
Here is another way for a bridge system to be even: one of the islands has 8 bridges
to/from it, and the other three islands have 2, 2, and 4 bridges to/from them, respectively.
While our generalisation supported some explanatorywhat-if-things-had-been-dierent
questions, it is simply silent on the system’s tourability if we changeX from odd to even
by allowing one island to have as many as 8 bridges to/from it. Similarly, it is silent on
what happens if we change X from even to odd by including 7 bridges to/from some
island. To answer what-if-things-had-been-dierent questions corresponding to these
cases, we need a broader generalisation, X = Y , that applies to systems as rich in
bridges as these.
27Here two dierences between our third dimension of abstraction and (even the extended) notion of
invariance in Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b] are important. First, we take the question to be whether
the variations destroy the explanation (not merely the generalisation). The generalisation itself does not
break down. It just does not apply. We take this focus on the whole explanation from Potochnik [2010]
and Weslake [2010]. Second, the range of variations are understood as the range of cases in which one of
the variables in the explanans can be changed without destroying the explanation. While this is also the
idea of the W-H account, in Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b] it is oen natural to interpret the range of
invariance as the range of changes in the variable values for which the generalisations continue to hold.
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Dierences in the determinate configurations do not explicitly feature as a variable
in the explanatory generalisation X = Y . Indeed, on the face of it the explanatory
generalisation looks the same regardless of the range of determinate what-if-things-had-
been-dierent questions it is taken to support. Dierences in the range of determinate
realizations of evenness/oddness do get into play through the restriction in application.
When we consider changes to the variable (even, odd) these changes have to go through
changes in the bridge system (there is no way to change the evenness of the system
that does not go through changing the specific configurations of the bridges). If we
are justified in taking the generalisation X = Y to apply to systems that have (say) a
maximum of three bridges between any two islands, then our explanation covers a wider
range of conditions directly relevant to changing the value of the explanans variable
X . In particular, we can now also consider what-if-things-had-been-dierent situations
with 7, 8 or 9 bridges to/from some island(s).
In this way we can straightforwardly compare dierent Königsberg explanations
with respect to their degree of abstraction in the third dimension. The explanation where
we restrict the generalisation to a maximum of three bridges between any two islands
applies to all the ways of varying the variable in the explanatory generalisation that
the explanation restricted to a maximum of two bridges covers—and then some! The
full-blown graph-theoretic explanation is, of course, maximally abstract along this third
dimension of abstractness. The explanatory generalisation now covers any (connected)
bridge system of arbitrary many islands and bridges. The graph-theoretic explanation
has considerable depth in contrast to the shallow, non-mathematical explanation. This
is solely due to increased abstraction along the third dimension. The explanatory depen-
dence of the shallow explanation is subsumed under a more general explanatory depen-
dence, enabling us to answer a much wider range of change relating what-if-things-had-
been-dierent questions. The shallow explanation does not contain irrelevant informa-
tion about the nature of the bridges, their material constitution or their length, say, or
about the underlying nomological features, such that the increase in explanatory depth
could be due to abstracting away from such information. Indeed, as already noted, the
explanans of these two explanations are already maximally abstract along the first and
second dimensions, and the considerable increase in the explanatory power should be
aributed solely to the third dimension of abstraction.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that paradigmatic abstract (plausibly) non-causal explanations can be
naturally accommodated with an account that associates explanatoriness with suitable
information about dependence. This improves the prospects of subsuming many ex-
planations under a unified counterfactual framework, opposing the current trend that
emphasizes the explanatory value of abstraction as a sui generis source of explanatori-
ness. We found the motivations for this trend questionable (§3), leaving room for a more
unified account.
More unified theories are oen beer, ceteris paribus, but we are not just expressing
this kind of a prima facie preference for unification. Rather, we motivate the unified ac-
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count by the following considerations. First, we argued that the unified account beer
captures intuitions about ‘explanatory depth’. Part of the force behind the W-H frame-
work comes from the fact that it provides a natural starting point for capturing intu-
itions about explanatory goodness (Woodward andHitchcock [2003a,b] and Ylikoski and
Kuorikoski [2010]). We argued, in the same spirit, that our viewpoint can be tested by
varying dependence information—the hypothesized source of explanatoriness—keeping
other things fixed (§5). We maintain that our intuitions about radically varying explana-
tory power naturally correspond to radically varying amounts of W-H dependence (but
not independence) information, in a way that is diicult to accommodate from the al-
ternative viewpoints.
Secondly, the unified account has a further virtue worth flagging. This has to do
with dissolving diicult questions facing the more disjunctive accounts that regard ab-
stract explanations fundamentally dierent from causal explanations in their source of
explanatoriness. Noting that causal explanations also typically abstract away from a
huge amount of physical detail raises a question about Pincock’s point of view, for exam-
ple: What explains the distinct qualitative dierence between causal explanations that
exhibit a degree of abstraction along each of the three dimensions, on the one hand, and
the sui generis ‘abstract explanations’, on the other? Is there a ‘threshold’ of abstrac-
tion above which the counterfactual conception fails, despite capturing abstract causal
explanations so well?
A similar question can be raised for Lange’s account. Many causal explanations also
abstract away from a huge amount of underlying nomological detail. Thus, all causal
explanations that incorporate a degree of abstraction along the second dimension of
abstraction also show how the explanandum is, to a corresponding degree, ‘necessary
to a stronger degree of necessity’ by virtue of showing the irrelevance of some of the
actual laws involved. So why is it that such modal information about independence be-
comes explanatory in a sui generis way in connection with abstract explanations? Or is
it the case that such modal information always contributes to the explanatory power,
but it contributes in a dierent way when an explanation abstracts away from (almost)
all nomological information, as in the case of ‘mathematical’ explanations?28 Why do
abstract explanations explain so dierently—in Salmon’s ‘modal’ mode—from causal ex-
planations that incorporate a degree of similar abstraction?
In our view Pincock and Lange have not provided satisfactory answers to these ques-
tions. In particular, their arguments that abstract explanations do not work by providing
information about causal dependence do not show that they work in a radically dierent
way instead (as opposed to providing information about non-causal W-H dependence).
The more unified account we advocate has the virtue of sidestepping these issues en-
tirely. According to this account the paradigmatic abstract explanations, despite their
non-causal character, are explanatory for the fundamentally same reason as causal ex-
planations are. In both cases the explanatory power springs from counterfactual infor-
mation of the same sort, and the paradigmatic exemplars of abstract explanations need
not be regarded as sui generis.
28Almost all, since these explanations still contain information associated with the various contingent
facts presupposed by the why question.
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